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This article constitutes a comprehensive study of the rules that
determine whether a particular tract of land or portion thereof is riparian.
Based upon this analysis of the different rules, Professor Farnham
recommends legislation for eastern jurisdictions which would designate
as riparian those lands which are within the watershed and which
abut and extend a reasonable distance from the particular body of
water.

THE PERMISSIBLE EXTENT OF
RIPARIAN LANDIt
William H. Farrnham*
INTRODUCTION

A

the problems created in the eastern states by
the pollution of their lakes and streams seem more urgent
to and are presently receiving more attention from government and the general public than the problems with respect
to the increase and allocation of water supplies, the problems
last referred to are quietly but inexorably becoming more
pressing because of the constantly increasing demand for
water and will again become critical whenever another
drought afflicts the East. After more than a decade of
consideration of the question as to whether the problems of
water supply and allocation could best be solved in the East
by a shift from the riparian system of water law to the appropriative system, or by the creation of a hybrid system cort
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prising the best features of both, or by nothing more radical
than a clarification and improvement of the riparian system,
the water law of most of the eastern states is still predominantly riparian in character.1 Knowledge of that law and
awarenesss of its uncertainties and of the need for elimination
of such uncertainties continues to be of importance in a majority of the eastern states. As long as uncertainties in riparian law exist, private persons contemplating embarkation on
water-based enterprises in riparian doctrine states may be deterred from an affirmative decision, 2 and government officials
of such states, charged with the formulation and execution
of public water projects, may find their task more difficult
than it should be.8
Since under the riparian system of water rights a person
can acquire them only by becoming the owner of riparian land4
or by succeeding to the water rights of a person who acquired
1. Trelease, Legal Contributions to Water Resources Development, U. CONN.
INST. OF WATER RESOURCES, REPORT No. 2, at 10 (1967); Maloney & Ausness, A Modern Proposal for State Regulation of Consumptive Uses of
Water, 22 HAST. L.J. 523, 523-29 (1971).
2. Farnham, The Improvement and Modernization of New York Water Law
Within the Framework of the Riparian System, 3 LAND & WATER L. REV.
377-78 (1968). See in addition to the authorities therein cited, Ellis, Developing Trends in Water Law in the Eastern States, PROCEEDINGS, PA. STATE
WATER RESOURCES LAW COLLOQUIM 24, 27 (1967); Champion, Prior Appropriation in Mississippi-A Statutory Analysis, 39 Miss. L.J. 1 (1967);
Plager, Some Observations on the Law of Water Allocation as a Variable
in Industrial Site Location, 1968 Wis. L. REv. 673; Plager & Maloney,
Emerging Patterns for Regulation of Consumptive Use of Water in the
Eastern United States, 43 IND. L.J. 383-84 (1968); Davis, Australian and
American Water Allocation Systems Compared, 9 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV.
647-77 (1968); Rarick, Oklahoma Water Law, Stream and Surface Under
the 1963 Amendments, 23 OKLA. L. REv. 19 (1970) ; Lauer, Reflections on
Riparianism, 35 Mo. L. REv. 1-15 (1970); An Economic Evaluation of
Connecticut Water Law, U. CONN., INSTITUTE OF WATER RESOURCES, REPORT
No. 11 (1970).
3. Farnham, The Improvement and Modernization of New York Water Law
Within the Framework of the Riparian System, 3 LAND & WATER L. REV.
377, 378-381 (1968). See in addition to the authorities therein cited, Emery
v. Knapp, 167 Kan. 546, 207 P.2d 440 (1949); Petition of Clinton Water
Dist. of Island County, 36 Wash. 2d 284, 218 P.2d 309, 314 (1950); MANN,
THE POLITICS OF WATER IN ARIZONA 16 (1963); Davidson, Application of
Limitations as to Damages Caused by Public Improvements, 16 BAYLOR L.
REV. 32 (1964); Johnson, Condemnation of Water Rights, 46 TEXAS L. INST.
473 (1968); statement of J. M. Kennedy, Chief, Northeastern U.S. Water
Supply Study Group, Planning Division, North Atlantic Division, U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers in PROCEEDINGS, FOURTH AMERICAN WATER
RESOURCES CONFERENCE 150-51 (1968); 4 LAND & WATER L. REV. 193
(1969); Corker, Book Review, 4 LAND & WATER L. REV. 219 (1969); Lauer,
Reflections on Riparianism,35 Mo. L. REV. 1 (1970).
4. United Paper Board Co. v. Iroquois Pulp & Paper Co., 226 N.Y. 38, 46,
123 N.E. 200, 203 (1919); LAUER, The RiparianRight as Property, in WATER
RESOURCES AND THE LAW 131 (1958); Trelease, Law, Water and People,
710, at 350 (1970).
18 WyO. L.J. 3 (1963); 5 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY
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them in that way,' it is obvious that in many instances the
success of a person's claim to the enjoyment of water rights
still depends in a majority of the eastern states, and in such
western states as recognize riparian as well as appropriative
water rights,' on whether a particular tract of land can be
classified as riparian.' Any uncertainty as to what land can
qualify as riparian would be particularly undesirable.
It should be noted, moreover, that the adoption by a riparian doctrine state of a permit system8 would not necessarily
eliminate the need for a satisfactory common law or statutory
definition of riparian land. Thus under the Model Water Use
Act, drafted at the University of Michigan Law School in
1958,' and under the Model Water Code, recently drafted at
the University of Florida Law School," the position of an
applicant for a permit will in some instances depend on
whether a certain water use which was being made when the
permit legislation was enacted was lawful; this in turn might
well depend on whether a certain tract of land was classifiable as riparian under the statutory or riparian common law
of the state.
5. It has been held in some states that riparian rights are not transferable
apart from the riparian land to which they are incident. See, e.g., Gould v.
Eaton, 117 Cal. 539, 49 P. 577 (1897). This has been considered by many
writers to be the majority view. See Trelease, Coordination of Riparian
and Appropriative Rights, 33 TEXAS L. REv. 24, 56-57 (1954); Arens,
Michigan Law of Water Allocation, in THE LAW OF WATER ALLOCATION IN
THE EASTERN UNITED STATES 377, 401 (Haber & Bergen ed. 1958). There
is authority for the contrary and preferable view. See Farnham, The
Improvement and Modernization of New York Water Law Within the
Framework of the Riparian System, 3 LAND & WATER L. REV. 377, 401-03
(1968).
6. As to the situation in these nine states see Trelease, Coordination of
Riparian and Appropriative Rights, 33 TExAS L. REV. 24 (1954) ; 5 POWELL,
REAL PROPERTY %749-42 (1970).
7. ZIEGLER, Water Use Under Common Law Doctrines, in WATER RESOURCES
AND THE LAW 49 (1958) says:
[T]he existence and extent of any right to use water largely
depends upon a determination of what land is riparian ....
For
this reason any attempt to determine the rights to use water necessitates an examination of the issue, what is riparian land. Id. at 52.
In the preceding discussion, the distinction between riparian
and non-riparian land was discussed in detail. This distinction is
consistently used by the courts to determine the rights of individuals to the use of stream or lake water. Id. at 63.
See also KATES, GEORGIA WATER LAW 81 (1969).
8. A state can continue to adhere to the riparian doctrine despite adoption of
an administratively enforced permit system. See Farnham, The Improvement and Modernization of New York Water Law within the Framework
of the Riparian System, 3 LAND & WATER L. REV. 377, 566-67 (1968).
9. Model Water Use Act reported in HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 178, 199

(1958).

10. See Maloney & Ausness, A Modern Proposal for State Regulation of Consumptive Uses of Water, 22 HAST. L.J. 523, 541, 544, 546-48 (1971).
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But however desirable the existence of a complete and well
established common law or statutory definition of riparian
land may be from the standpoint of private persons and government officials concerned with water rights in the eastern
states, no such definition can be found in their riparian common law, and only one of them has enacted a statutory definition." The simple point that seems to be well settled is that
to be riparian, land must border on a natural lake or stream. 2
Thus in many eastern states the important question regarding
the permissible extent of riparian land-whether all of
a tract of land bordering on a lake or stream is riparian regardless of the fact that much of it is far distant from the
water-is still an open one to which a legislative answer would
seem highly desirable.13 But what should this answer be?
Should it codify the view that such part of a tract of land as
lies outside the watershed 4 of a body of water is not riparian
to it, although one side of the tract borders on the water? This
view seems to be well established in such of the western states
as recognize riparian as well as appropriative rights ;1" ap11. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-104(5) (1968). But it can be argued that this
definition is not satisfactory. See note 101 infra and accompanying text.
12. Among the numerous authorities supporting this rule are the following:
Hudson v. West, 47 Cal. 2d 823, 306 P.2d 807 (1957); Harvey Realty Co.
v. Borough of Wallingford, 111 Conn. Supp. 352, 150 A. 60 (1930) ; Peck v.
Olson Construction Co., 216 Iowa 519, 245 N.W. 131 (1932); Thompson v.
Enz, 379 Mich. 667, 154 N.W.2d 473 (1967); Stratbucker v. Junge, 153
Neb. 885, 46 N.W.2d 486 (1951) ; United Paper Board Co. v. Iroquois Pulp
and Paper Co., 226 N.Y. 38, 123 N.E. 200 (1919); Young v. City of
Asheville, 241 N.C. 618, 86 S.E.2d 408 (1955); Jones v. Con, 39 Ore. 30,
64 P. 855 (1901); KINNEY, THE LAW OF IRRIGATION § 58 (1894); 2 FARNHAM, THE LAW OF WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 463 (a) (1904) ; 3 TIFFANY,
REAL PROPERTY § 727 (3rd. ed. 1939); 6A AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY
§ 28.55, at 160 (Casner ed. 1952); HUTCHINS, CALIFORNIA LAW OF WATER
RIGHTS 197 (1956) ; ZIEGLER, Water Use Under Common Law Doctrines, in
WATER RESOURCES AND THE LAW 49, 52 (1958); MANN, ELLIS & KRAUSz,
WATER-UsE LAW IN ILLINOIS 16 (1964); 1 ROGERS & NICHOLS, WATER
714, at 372
FOR CALIFORNIA 225 (1967); 5 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY

13.

(1970).
For authority

recommending

legislation

see CRIBBET,

ILLINOIS

WATER

RIGHTS LAW 50 (1958) ; KATES, GEORGIA WATER LAW 82, 334 (1969) ; Lauer,

Reflections on Riparianism,35 Mo. L. REV. 1, 23 (1970). Beyond the scope
of this article is a discussion of the validity of the Torts Restatement
position that if the bed of a body of water is in private ownership, a tract
of land, though bordering on it, cannot be riparian unless it includes part
of the bed of the body of water. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 843, Comment f, at 329-30 (1939).
714, n. 11 (1970). The term "water14. E.g., 5 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY
shed" is used herein to denote the drainage area contributing to the water
found in the lake or stream involved.
15. See Hudson v. West, 47 Cal. 2d 823, 306 P.2d 807 (1957); Clark v. Allaman, 71 Kan. 206, 80 P. 571 (1905); Sayles v. City of Mitchell, 60 S.D.
592, 245 N.W. 390 (1932); Watkins Land Co. v. Clements, 98 Tex. 578,
86 S.W. 733 (1905). Treating this as the majority view are 1 WIEL, WATER
RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES §§ 773-75 (3d ed. 1911); Teass, Water and
Water Courses-Riparian Rights, 18 VA. L. REV. 223, 224 (1932); 3
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pears to have been accepted as a common law proposition in
three eastern states ;1" has been codified in Virginia ;1 and is

embodied in the Torts Restatement. 8
THE

WATERSHED LIMITATION

In support of this position it has been said that land beyond the watershed is outside the boundaries established by
nature for riparian ownership ;19 that adherence to it is convenient and practical ;20 that lake or stream water used on land
within the watershed will, so far as it is not consumed, return to the parent body of water ;21 and if use of water from
stream X is permitted on land outside its watershed and within
the watershed of stream Y, the reasonable and natural expectations of the lower riparian owners on stream X of benefit
from the unconsumed part of the water will be disappointed. "
And it should be added that the riparian owners on stream Y,
who might under some circumstances be in a position to complain of the addition of foreign water 2" to that stream, 4
§ 727 (1939); 6A AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY
§ 28.55, at 160 (Casner ed. 1952) ; Davis, Water Rights in Iowa, 41 IOWA
L. REV. 216, 220 (1956); 34 N.C. L. REV. 247, 248 (1956); ZIEGLER, Water
Use Under Common Law Doctrines, in WATER RESOURCES AND THE LAW
714, at 373 (1970).
49, 59 (1958); 5 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY
16. See McCarter v. Hudson County Water Co., 70 N.J.Eq. 695, 65 A. 489
Boys' School, 216 Mass. 83,
Hermon
v.
Mt.
Stratton
1906);
&
App.,
(Err.
103 N.E. 87 (1913), Town of Gordonsville v. Zinn, 129 Va. 542, 106 S.E.
508, 511 (1921).
17. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-104(5) (1968). If the watershed limitation ever
existed in Iowa, it has been abolished by statute. See O'Connell, Iowa's
New Water Statute, 47 IOWA L. REV. 627 (1962).
TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY

18.

RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 855, comment a,

at 374 (1939).

19. 2 FARNHAM, THE LAW OF WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 1571 (1904).
20. Wiel, Origin and Comparative Development of The Law of Watercourses,
6 CAL. L. REV. 245, 352 (1918).
21. Anaheim Union Water Co. v. Fuller, 150 Cal. 327, 88 P. 978 (1907).
22. See Stratton v. Mt. Hermon Boys' School, 216 Mass. 83, 86, 103 N.E. 87,
88 (1913) in which the court said:
A brook or river, so far as concerns surface indications, is inseparably connected with its watershed and owes the volume of current
to its area. A definite and fixed channel is a part of the conception of a watercourse. To divert a substantial portion of its flow
is the creation of a new and different channel, which to that extent
defeats the reasonable and natural expectations of the owners lower
down on the old channel. Abstractions for use elsewhere not only
diminishes the flow of the particular stream but also increases
that which drains the watershed into which the diversion is made,
and thereby may injure riparian rights upon it.
23. Water from a source not naturally tributary to the body of water to
which it is added.
24. Regarding the possible illegality of the addition of foreign water see the
quotation from Stratton in note 22 supra; Farnham, The Improvement and
Modernization of New York Water Law Within the Framework of The
Riparian System, 3 LAND & WATER L. REV. 377, 393 (1968); Fell v. M. &
T., Inc., 73 Cal. App. 2d 692, 166 P.2d 642 (1946); Barnard v. Sherley,
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might under other circumstances receive an unexpected benefit in the form of water from stream X on the availability
of which they had never counted. Such an advantage was
probably not reflected in the price which they paid for their
riparian land on stream Y. Thus the riparians on stream X,
who owned land below the point of diversion to stream Y,
could argue with considerable force that the definition of riparian land should not be so broad as to include land on which
water from stream X could not be used without depriving
them of all possible benefit from the entire amount withdrawn
and without creating a possibility of benefit from that water
to riparian owners on stream Y, who had paid nothing for
it and never expected to have it.
In support of the holding in Jones v. Conn 5 that land
can be riparian to a body of water although not within its
watershed, provided it is part of a tract bordering on a
stream,"6 it has been suggested that such a rule would give
no riparian owner just ground for complaint because it would
increase rather than diminish the quantum of all riparian interests.2" It is not certain, however, that the benefit which
135 Ind. 547, 35 N.E. 117 (1893) ; Leitch v. Sanitary District of Chicago,
369 1I1. 469, 17 N.E.2d 34, 36 (1938); Barrington Hills Country Club v.
Village of Barrington, 357 Ill. 11, 191 N.E. 239 (1934) ; Jackman v.
Arlington Mills, 137 Mass. 227, 284 (1884) ; Mayor of Baltimore v. Appold,
42 Md. 442, 457 (1895) ; Tollotson v. Smith, 32 N.H. 90 (1855); Merritt v.
Parker, 1 N.J.L. 460 (Sup. Ct. 1795) ; Matter of Gillespie, 247 App. Div.
228, 288 N.Y.S. 49 rev'd on other grounds, 272 N.Y. 18, 3 N.E.2d 618
(1936); Miller v. Wheeler, 54 Wash. 429, 103 P. 641, 643 (1909).
25. 39 Ore. 30, 64 P. 855, 858 (1901).
26. Although in Standen v. New Rochelle Water Co., 91 Hun. 272, 36 N.Y.S.
92, 94 (Sup. Ct. 1895) the court said:
We also think that the extent of watershed of the two parties to
this suit was not material evidence upon the issues in this case,
and that its admission was error. The plaintiff was not limited
in her use of the water by the fact that the defendant owned a
larger watershed than she did. She was entitled to the beneficial
use of all the water that flowed in the stream, except such as was
reasonably used by the defendant. The rights of the parties did
not at all depend upon the extent of the watershed owned by them.
Although attention was called to the last sentence quoted in 2 FARNHAM,
THE LAW OF WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 1572 (1904) and 1 WIEL, WATER
RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN UNITED STATES 744 (3rd ed. 1911) as relevant
to the question as to whether land outside the watershed can be riparian,
the case does not appear to be authority indicating that the New York
courts have answered this question. When read in the light of the first
and second sentences, the last sentence appears to use "watershed" to
denote riparian land within the watershed rather than land beyond it.
Another state which has not yet answered the question is South Carolina.
See Guerard, The Riparian Rights Doctrine in South Carolina, 21 S.C.
L. REv. 757, 762 (1969).
27. See O'Connell, Iowa's New Water Statute, 47 IOwA L. REv. 549, 627-28
(1962).
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would accrue to most riparians from a rejection of the watershed limitation on the permissible extent of riparian land
would be actual rather than merely theoretical. No
riparian owner could actually benefit from it unless he owned
land beyond the watershed which qualified as riparian by virtue of the adoption of the suggestion. Moreover, it is doubtful
that a significant number of tracts bordering on a stream
would extend so far inland as to include an area beyond the
watershed."
It can also be argued in support of the rule of Jones v.
Conn that, if a use of water is being made outside the watershed, the location of the use will be taken into account when
passing on its reasonableness and legality2 9 and that the interests of riparian owners downstream from the use in question will therefore be adequately protected. It must be admitted that this argument has considerable force and that in
many cases the answer to the question as to whether the use
beyond the watershed was lawful would be the same, regardless of whether the rule applied was that having majority
support or that laid down in Jones v. Conn. If A is claiming
the privilege of using the water on a part of his land which
lies beyond the watershed, his claim might well be denied,
even by a court following Jones v. Conn, on the ground that
under all the circumstances in the case A's use beyond the
watershed would be unreasonable. Nevertheless, it would
seem clear that the lower riparians can be more sure of protection from use outside the watershed in a state in which the
rule in force was that land could not qualify as riparian unless it lay within the watershed. And it could be argued that,
since most riparian owners would expect that they would be
required to share the water only with such other persons as
wished to use it on land within the watershed and since such
an exception is natural and reasonable,"° they are entitled to
28. As to the possibilities under Iowa's topographical conditions see id. at 627,
n. 480.
29. Jones v. Conn, 39 Ore. 30, 64 P. 855, 858 (1901), rehearing denied, 39 Ore.
46, 65 P. 1068 (1901). See the quotation from the opinion in this case in
note 48 infra.
30. "[O]ne of the expectations of the riparian owner is freedom from competition from any source other than co-riparians, who are subject to the
restrictions of the reasonable use doctrine." Note, The Constitutional
Sanctity of a Property Interest in a Riparian Right, 1969 WASH. U.L.Q.
327, 337-38. See also the quotation from Stratton in note 22 supra.
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have their use protected 1 by giving them an absolute preference over users beyond the watershed, unless made by persons
who had acquired riparian rights from a riparian owner by
transfer, the extent of which would be measured by the extent
in the hands of the transferor. 2
But is the enforcement of the watershed limitation on the
permissible extent of riparian land unwise in view of the
virtually unanimous opinion that the restrictions imposed by
the unmodified common law riparian doctrine on non-riparian
use should considerably relaxed V" Would adherence to such
a limitation put too much of an obstacle in the path of the
interbasin water transfers which are believed by many to be
31. The courts, when passing on the validity of a statute as a police power
measure, carefully consider the question of the extent to which it would
disappoint the reasonable expectations of property owners by making
unforeseeable changes in the common law. Hughes v. State of Washington,
389 U.S. 290, 296-97 (1967); O'Connell, supra note 27, at 583; Plager &
Maloney, Emerging Patterns for Regulation of Consumptive Use of Water
in the Eastern United States, 43 IND. L.J. 383, 386 (1968); FISHER, Duo
Process and the Effect of Eastern Appropriation Proposals on Existing
Rights, With Special Emphasis on the Michigan Proposal, in THE LAW OF
WATER ALLOCATION IN THE EASTERN UNITED STATES 441, 448 (Haber &
Bergen ed. 1958). It would seem entirely reasonable to offer the importance
of protecting such expectations as one of the bases for adherence to or
adoption of the watershed limitation on the permissible extent of riparian
land. Water law should be consistent with "an ethical commitment to the
concept of fairplay." Carver, A Federal Policy for Development of Western
Water, 14 ROCKY MT. MINERAL L. INST. 473, 474 (1968). This would seem
to involve consideration for the reasonable expectations of the buyers of
riparian land.
32. In states that permit the transfer of riparian rights, the interests of
riparians not parties to the transfer are protected by a rule that the
transferee acquires water use privileges no greater than those possessed
by his transferor. Farnham, The Improvement and Modernization of New
York Water Law Within the Framework of the Riparian System, 3 LAND
& WATER L. REV. 377, 401-02 (1968). This position is consistent with the
well established general rule that a grantor can convey no more than he
has. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 217, at 160 (Casner ed. 1952);
Duckworth v. Watsonville Water & Light Co., 150 Cal. 520, 89 P. 338
(1907); Taylor v. Armiger Body Shop, 40 Del. Ch. 22, 172 A.2d 572, 573
(1961). This position is also consistent with the equally well established
rule that the power of the owner of a profit a prendre to take water is
subject to the same limitation. See Loch Sheldrake Associates v. Evans,
306 N.Y. 297, 118 N.E.2d 444 (1954). Regarding the close relationship
which sometimes exists between easements and profits, on the one hand,
and riparian privileges and rights, on the other see Beck, Governmental
Refilling of Lakes and Ponds, 46 TExAs L. REV. 180, 185 (1967). This
relationship was not, however, referred to in Loch Sheldrake.
33. In addition to the authorities cited in Farnham, The Improvement and
Modernization of New York Water Law Within the Framework of the
Riparian System, 3 LAND & WATER L. REV. 377, 413 (1968), see
38 B.U.L. REV. 207, 240-41 (1958); ABA SECTION OF MINERAL AND
NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 22 (1959); 62 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 11 (1959); 47
IOWA L. REV. 549, 557 (1962); ABA SECTION OF MINERAL AND NATURAL
RESOURCES LAW 13, 20 (1964); Davis, Australian and American Water
Allocation Systems Compared, 9 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 647, 700 (1968) ;
Guerand, The Riparian Rights Doctrine in South Carolina, 21 S.C. L. REV.
759, 769 (1969).
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essential to the satisfactory solution to some of our water
supply problems ? Arguments in favor of affirmative answers to these questions are supplied by the following statements:
[T]he most effective development, management and
protection of water resources is most readily achieved
when the broadest areas of land are eligible to receive the water....
Assuming that the greatest number of beneficial
water uses today require the water to be removed
from the water course in which it is found, the broadest definition of riparian land would ... maximize
the number of landowners eligible to use water found
in a watercourse, thereby increasing both the chance
that the resource would be actually used and that the
uses made would be those most beneficial.
It could be pointed out, however, that the first statement
quoted seems to amount in substance to an assertion that it
is easier to achieve the most effective development, management and protection of water resources under the prior appropriation system, which does not discriminate against nonriparian use, than under the riparian system which does. That
this opinion is entertained by many cannot be denied; but it is
equally true that there are many others who do not. It seems
unlikely that either group will ever be able to make a conclusive case for its position. 5 Since the problem under consideration is not as to which of these two systems is the better,8"
it can be laid aside and attention can be fixed on the question
as to what should be done about the watershed limitation on
the permissible extent of riparian land in states which have
34. Waite, Beneficial Use of Water in a Riparian Jurisdiction, 1969 WIs. L.
REV. 864, 874-75.
35. Pertinent in this connection is the following statement from TRELEASE,
New Water Laws for Old and New Countries, UNIV. OF TEXAS WATER LAW
CONFERENCE (1969):

When I was young and innocent, I used to think that the western
American invention of prior appropriation was the best of water
use laws, a model which had failed to blanket the earth only because of the ignorance of those who had not yet adopted it.
But finding out how the other half lives, how other people have
solved problems similar to ours, has some value for us. . . . One
thing I have learned from my comparative study is humility. I
no longer believe that western prior appropriation is the panacea
for all of the world's ills.
36. Even a superficial discussion of the question would require far more space
than has been allotted to this article.
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not elected to abandon the riparian system and are trying to
improve it by clarification and modification.
It must be conceded, of course, that the second statement
quoted, viz., that the broadest definition of riparian land
would maximize the number of landowners eligible to use the
water, is true if the assumption on which it is based is validthat the greatest number of beneficial water uses today require
the water to be removed from the watercourse in which it is
found. This assumption, however, seems to be a debatable one." Moreover, it is conceivable, though far from
certain even if the debatable assumption be accepted, that,
as alleged in the second statement quoted, the broadest definition of riparian land would increase the chance that the water
would actually be used and that the uses made would be the
most beneficial.
But assuming the truth of both statements and of the assumption on which the second was based, should not the reasonable expectations of the buyers of riparian land, to which
reference has already been made 3 -that they would not have
to share the water from their source of supply with owners of
land outside its watershed-be given the protection which
would be jeopardized, even if not completely denied, by a definition of riparian land which would enable areas beyond the
watershed to qualify as riparian ? For reasons previously
stated the general riparian rule that every use, wherever located, must be reasonable if it is to be lawful, clearly would
not guarantee the riparian owners the protection against use
outside the watershed which they reasonably expected.39
Happily, however, it would seem that even if the watershed limitation were adopted to protect these expectations,
the public interest in the optimum use of water could be sufficiently served in any state which would (1) enact a statute
providing in substance that a riparian owner could substitute
his non-riparian land for his riparian land as the beneficiary
37. Although uttered in another context, the following statement has relevance
here: "[I]t is very often the case with natural resources that they have
their broadest uses when they are left essentially in their natural state."
Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law, 68 MICH. L. Rsv.
471, 565 (1970).
38. See notes 22 and 30 supra and accompanying text.
39. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
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of his riparian privileges of user, provided the amount used
on his non-riparian land did not exceed that which he could
lawfully have used on his riparian land4 ° and that such nonriparian use was not more harmful to other riparians than
his use on his riparian land would have been; and (2) if its
courts had not already so held,41 enact a statute providing that
riparian rights are transferable to non-riparians and that the
extent of the transferee's privileges of user would be determined by the extent of those possessed by the riparian transferor. While under such legislation there could be a technical
disappointment of the expectation of the buyers of riparian
land in that use outside the watershed would in some cases be
permitted, it would be a harmless disappointment because, in
view of the limitations on the extent of the non-riparian use,
no riparian would have to submit to greater harm from a use
of water by others than he would have been bound to accept
if the water had been used only on riparian land. Moreover,
the riparian owner, who for some reason could not or did not
wish to make use of his riparian privileges, would benefit by
his ability to turn them into money; and since riparian rights,
if transferable, would normally be available to the highest
bidder and since when they are so available they are likely
to be employed in the most productive activity, 2 the public
interest in achieving that result would be sufficiently
furthered.
40. Partial precedent for such a statute is furnished by WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 30.18(5) (1971) which provides inter alia: "When it is determined that
a riparian permittee is authorized to withdraw a stated flow of water,
he may use that water on any other land contiguous to his riparian land,
but he may not withdraw more water than he did prior to August 1, 1957."
41. The Oklahoma Supreme Court has so held. Smith v. Stanolind Oil & Gas.
Co., 179 Okla. 488, 172 P.2d 1002 (1946). Inferences consistent with the
Oklahoma court's holding can be drawn from the following cases: FPC v.
Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 347 U.S. 239 (1953); United Paper Board
Co. v. Iroquois Pulp & Paper Co., 226 N.Y. 38, 123 N.E. 200 (1919).
42. "Where there is competition for water, it is doubtful that there is a better
way of determining the most productive use than through the willingness
of a prospective user to pay as much for a water right as a current user
considers he must receive to relinquish it." Fox, Water: Supply, Demand
and the Law, 32 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 452, 462 (1960). In Levi, Highest
and Best Use: An Economic Goal for Water Law, 34 Mo. L. REv. 165,
174 (1969) it is said that "those who can use the water more profitably
will be willing to pay more for the water right." Trelease, Policies for
Water, 5 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 1, 6 (1965) says:
Decisions as to the most productive or wisest use of property can be
made by private persons .... The maximization principle is generally believed to be achieved, or approached by free men in a capitalistic society when they make decisions on where and how they will
employ their labor and capital.
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If it be objected that a watershed limitation on the permissible extent of riparian land is undesirable because satisfactory solutions to some of the water supply problems which
have arisen in the East may depend on arranging for the
transfer of water from one watershed to another, it can be
pointed out that such a limitation would as a practical matter
seldom constitute the primary obstacle to the execution of an
interbasin transfer of the public project type. Most such projects would involve the use of water from a lake or stream not
merely beyond its watershed, on the rear part of a tract of land
in contact with the lake or stream, but would be intended to
supply water for use on land, no part of which has any contact with the source lake or stream and so has no basis whatever for a claim to riparian relation with the water source."
In other words, unless the governmental body which was engaged in the project had obtained the water rights of the riparian owners on the source lake or stream by purchase or
eminent domain, the rule against harmful non-riparian use44
would block such an interbasin transfer45 even though there
were no rule that land outside the watershed of a lake or
stream could not qualify as riparian to the lake or stream.
A watershed limitation on the permissible extent of riparian rights would, however, be a primary obstacle in the
43. Land must have contact with a body of water in order to be held to be
riparian to it. See note 12 supra,and accompanying text.
44. See 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 725, at 124 (3rd ed. 1939) ; 6A AMERICAN
LAW OF PROPERTY § 28.55, at 162, 164 (Casner ed. 1952); 34 N.C. L. REV.
247 (1956); Trelease, The Concept of Reasonable Beneficial Use in the
Law of Surface Streams, 12 WYo. L.J. 1, 2 (1957); 5 POWELL, REAL
PROPERTY 714, at 375-76 (1970).
45. This would not, however, be unqualifiedly true in all eastern states. Thus
it has been held that Minnesota can take water from navigable streams for
municipal supply, which is usually classified as a non-riparian use. Annot.,
141 A.L.R. 639 (1942); 2 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 5.795 (3rd ed.
1950); Johnson, Riparian and Public Rights to Lakes and Streams,
35 WASH. L. REV. 580, 610-11, n. 141 (1960); ABA SECTION OF MINERAL
AND NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 13, 15, 20 (1964); Aycock, Introduction to
Water Use Law in North Carolina, 46 N.C. L. REV. 1, 4, 8 (1967). No
financial obligation is thereby incurred. See St. Anthony Falls Water Co.
v. St. Paul Water Comm'r, 168 U.S. 349 (1897); Minneapolis Mill Co. v.
Board of Water Comm'rs, 56 Minn. 485, 58 N.W. 33 (1894); Power Co. v.
St. Paul Water Comm'r, 168 U.S. 349 (1897). In New York, if the state
owns the bed of a lake or stream, it may, by the exercise of a sovereign
or reserve power, devote the water to a public purpose without compensating riparian owners harmed by its act. See Hackensack Water Co. v.
Village of Nyack, 289 F. Supp. 671, 683 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); New York v.
System Properties, Inc., 2 N.Y.2d 330, 141 N.W.2d 429, 160 N.Y.S.2d 859
(1953); Niagara Falls Power Co. v. Duryea, 185 Misc. 696, 57 N.Y.S.2d
777 (Sup. Ct., 1945). Regarding the situation in Pennsylvania see Rundle
v. Delaware & Raritan Canal Co., 55 U.S. 80 (1852); Fulmer v. Williams,
122 Pa. 191, 15 A. 726 (1888).
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way of a private interbasin transfer, such as would be involved
if a man who owned a tract of land in contact with a stream
wanted to use some of the water on a part of the tract
which lay outside the stream's watershed. But it is far from
certain that this fact affords a sufficient reason for rejecting
the watershed limitation. It is rather unlikely that the owner
of such a tract expected when he bought it that he could use
the stream water beyond the watershed. He would probably
realize that such a use would deprive the lower riparian
owners of all possible benefit from the unconsumed part of the
withdrawn water and that the law could not be expected to
allow him to make any use which would have such an effect.
In short, a statute adopting the watershed limitation would
not disappoint any reasonable and natural expectation of
such an owner. It is submitted, therefore, that he should be
content with the legislation above proposed, which would
enable him to buy the water right of a riparian owner for use
outside the watershed without having to tie up any money
in the purchase of riparian land for which he might not have
any real use.
RULES REGARDING

EXTENT

OF

IRIPARIAN LAND WITHIN THE WATERSHED

Another important question concerning the permissible
extent of riparian land which stands virtually unanswered in
the East and for which an answer should be supplied by statute is the following: Assuming that a large tract of land
borders on a body of water and is entirely within its watershed, can all of such tract qualify as riparian even if it extends inland for a considerable distance? The following four
views have been expressed as to what answer should be given
to this question; no one of them has sufficient legislative or
judicial support to justify the statement that it is the one
entertained by the weight of authority.
1. "[R]iparian land stops at the outermost edge of the
land away from the stream as described by a single original entry of the land in the acquisition of title from the
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(Hereinafter referred to as the governgovernment."
ment survey rule.)
2. Riparian status can be accorded only to "the smallest
separate piece or parcel of land bordering upon the
stream in the history of the title of all of the land of the
riparian owner at the time that the claim is made or at
the time of use." 7 (Hereinafter referred to as the smallest tract rule.)
3. The area or size of the parcel is immaterial insofar as
its character as riparian land is concerned.48 (Hereinafter
referred to as the no limit rule.)
46. 1 KINNEY, THE LAW OF IRRIGATION AND WATER RIGHTS 789 (2d ed. 1912).
For a substantially similar statement see 1 WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE
WESTERN UNITED STATES 838-39 (3rd ed. 1911). One case supporting this
view is Watkins Land Co. v. Clements, 98 Tex. 578, 86 S.W. 733, 735
(1905) in which it was said: "Riparian rights arise out of the ownership
of land through or by which a stream of water flows, which rights cannot
extend beyond the original survey as granted by the government." As
recognizing the prevalence of the government survey rule in Texas see
Sun Co. v. Gibson, 295 F. 118 (1923) ; American Cyanamid Co. v. Sparto,
267 F.2d 425, 428 (1959). Also apparently supporting this view is the
concurring opinion of McFadden, J. in Harrell v. City of Conway, 224
Ark. 100, 271 S.W.2d 924, 929 (1954). While this positon as also taken
790-91 (1903)
in Crawford Co. v. Hathaway, 67 Neb. 325, 93 N.W. '8,
and In re Platte Valley Pub. Power & Irrigation Dist., 132 Neb. 292, 271
N.W. 864, 867 (1937), it was substantially qualified in Wasserburger v.
Coffee, 180 Neb. 149, 141 N.W.2d 738, 745 (1966). This rule has also been
administratively applied in Minnesota without either a legislative or judicial
mandate for such application. ELLIS, Water Rights and Regulations in
the Eastern United States, in 5 WATER FOR PEACE 649, 657 (1967).
47.

1 KINNEY, THE LAW OF IRRIGATION AND WATER RIGHTS 789 (2d ed. 1912).
See

also HUTCHINS,

SELECTED PROBLEMS

IN

THE LAW

OF WATER RIGHTS

IN THE WEST 46 (1942). This view now prevails in California. Although
in Title Insurance Co. v. Miller & Lux, 183 Cal. 71, 190 P. 433, 437 (1920)
the court said that the "single conveyance from the state" principle was
"well settled" in California, the opinion in Rancho Santa Margarita v.
Vail, 11 Cal. 2d 501, 81 P.2d 533, 547 (1938) declares that "[t]he riparian
right extends only to the smallest tract held under one title in the chain
of title leading to the present owner, that is that the land's riparian status
has not been lost by severance." In neither Vail nor Hudson was Title
Insurance Company cited on the issue as to the permissible extent of
riparian land or was any reference made to the government survey limitation. Nor did either the Vail or Hudson opinion advert in this connection
to the statement in Alta Land & Water Co. v. Hancock, 85 Cal. 219, 24
P. 645 (1890) that the occupants of every tract, held as an entirety and
bordering on the stream, whatever its extent have riparian rights. This
statement is interpreted in 1 WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN UNITED

STATES 840 (3rd ed. 1911) as giving support to the view that the area of
a parcel of land is immaterial insofar as its character as riparian land is
concerned. This rule has also been administratively applied in Wisconsin
without either a legislative or judicial mandate for such application. ELLIS,
Water Rights and Regulations in the Eastern United States, in 5 WATER
FOR PEACE 649, 657 (1967).
48.

1 WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN

THE WESTERN

UNITED STATES 836-37

(3rd ed.

1911); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 843, comment c, at 327 (1939). This view is
clearly supported by the following statements appearing in the court's
opinion in Jones v. Conn, 39 Ore. 30, 64 P. 855, 858, rehearing denied, 39
Ore. 46, 65 P. 1068 (1901):
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4. "[T]he land for which riparian rights are claimed...
must be reasonable in extent." 0 (Hereinafter referred to
as the reasonable limit rule.)
[L]ands bordering on a stream are riparian, without regard to
[W]e are unable to find any rule determining
their extent....
when part of an entire tract owned by one person ceases to be riparian.... [A]ny person owning land which abuts upon or through
which a natural stream of water flows is a riparian proprietor,
entitled to the rights of such, without regard to the extent of his
land, or from whom or when he acquired his title.... By virtue of
the ownership of land in proximity to the stream, he is entitled to
a reasonable use of the water.... In the determination of what will
be considered such a use in a particular case, the character and extent of the land, its location, and the time of acquiring the title may
all become, and are, no doubt, important factors to be considered;
but they are not controlling, and each case must depend entirely on
its own facts and circumstances.
In Clark v. Allaman, 71 Kan. 206, 80 P. 571, 585 (1905) the court quoted
a substantial part of the above extract from the Jones opinion to support
its rejection of the government survey rule. Whether State Hospital for
Criminal Insane v. Consolidated Water Supply Co., 267 Pa. 29, 110 A. 281
(1920) supports the no limit rule as suggested in MANN, ELLIS & KRAUSZ,
WATER-USE LAW IN ILLINOIS 16 (1964) is not entirely clear. The water
in this case was being used on land apparently contiguous to a riparian
tract but beyond the watershed of the stream and about a mile a d a half
from the stream. The court apparently considered the questin as to
whether such use was on riparian land, but the opinion containet1no clear
statement in this regard. It is conceivable that the case might be interpreted as standing for the proposition that use on non-riparian land is
lawful unless harmful, a view which has considerable support. See authorities cited note 44 supra; FISHER, Due Process and the Effect of Eastern
Appropriation Proposals on Existing Rights, With Special Emphasis on
the Michigan Proposal,in THE LAW OF WATER ALLOCATION IN THE EASTERN
UNITED STATES 441, 481 (Haber & Bergen ed, 1958); Hanks, The Law of
Water in New Jersey, 22 RUTGERS L. REs. 621, 630 (1968).
49. 1 KINNEY, THE LAW OF IRRIGATION AND WATER RIGHTS 789 (2d ed. 1912).
See also 6A AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 28.55, at 162 (Casner ed. 1952).
Among the cases supporting this view is Sparks Mfg. Co. v. Town of
Newton, 57 N.J. Eq. 367, 392, 41 A. 385 (1898), rev'd on other grounds,
60 N.J. Eq. 399, 45 A. 596 (Err. & App. 1900) in which the court said:
The courts have been unable to define the distance to which a riparian proprietor's right of user for domestic and such purposes
extends; nor have they been able to say what proportion of the
stream might be used for such purposes. These questions depend
upon the circumstances of each case as they present themselves, and
the only rule which has or can be laid down is that both the distance
and the use must be reasonable. Applying that rule here, we
find, as a matter of fact, that the ownership of a portion of the
banks of the stream by the Town of Newton gives it no right to
divert the water.
Also supporting the reasonable limit rule is McCartney v. Londonderry &
Lough Swilly Ry. Co., Ltd., [1904] A.C. 301, 311. The court held that a
railway which owned a small tract on the bank of a stream was not
entitled to carry water taken from it along its own land to a tank half a
mile off and to consume it in their locomotives and in explanation of its
holding said:
[I]t would be extravagant to suggest that the system of the . . .
Railway company and the lines of other companies over which they
have running powers form a single riparian tenement, or that the
railway company, by virtue of contact with the stream at one point,
possess throughout their system, and all through the lines of other
companies over which they have running powers, rights analogous
to those possessed by persons who dwell on the banks of a river in
respect of their riverside property. It may be difficult to say how
far the rights of the railway company as riparian owners extend,
but they can hardly go to such a length as that,

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1972

15

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 7 [1972], Iss. 1, Art. 2

46

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. VII

A. Government Survey Rule
For several reasons it would seem inadvisable for the
eastern states to choose the first of these rules: viz., that the
boundaries of a riparian tract cannot extend beyond those fixed
in the original government grant of a parcel of land bordering
on the water. Even in the few states approving that rule, the
courts have, as in Crawford Co. v. Hathaway," offered no
reason for doing so other than that its adoption would be consistent with the federal practice of restricting the amount of
public land which a settler could acquire from the federal
government by perfecting an entry and with the state practice
of disposing of school lands in limited quantities; practices
apparently adopted as tending to implement a policy against
concentration of land ownership in the hands of a few and in
favor of the distribution of small quantities of land among a
large number of citizens, who could be expected to support
themselves and their families by engaging thereon in agricultural pursuits."
See also McCarter v. Hudson County Water Co., 70 N.J. Eq. 695, 708, 65
A. 489 (Err. & App. 1906), ajf'd U.S. 349 (1908) in which the
court held that the water company was not entitled at common
law to take water from a stream and export it to another state, and that
a New Jersey statute forbidding the transportation of water from New
Jersey lakes and streams into another state was constitutional; and said
inter alia in support of such holdings: "By the common law of England
the right of diversion appears to have been confined to lands of the
riparian proprietor, extending a reasonable distance from the bed of the
stream." The decision was affirmed on the ground that the statute constituted a valid exercise of the police power rather than on the proposition
as to the extent of riparian land. See also Attwood v. Llay Main Collieries,
Ltd., [1926] 1 Ch. 444, 459-60 in which the court said:
The proposition that every piece of land in the same occupation
which includes a portion of the river bank and therefore affords
access to the river is a riparian tenement is, in my opinion, far
too wide. In order to test it, let me take an extreme case: nobody
in their senses would seriously suggest that the site of Paddington
Station and Hotel is a riparian tenement, although it is connected
with the river Thames by a strip of land many miles long, nor
could it reasonably be suggested that the whole of a large estate
of, say 2000 acres was a riparian tenement, because a small portion
of it was bounded by a stream. Yet, if the argument submitted in
the present case on behalf of the defendant company were carried to
its logical conclusion, both Paddington Station and Hotel and the
hypothetical estate would be riparian tenements. In the present
case the site of the defendants' works is, in my opinion, too far
away from the river bank to sustain the character of a riparian
tenement, and I find as a fact that it is not such a tenement.
50. 67 Neb. 325, 93 N.W. 781, 791 (1903).
51. As to this policy see Taylor, The Excess Land Law: Execution of a Public
Policy, 64 Yale L.J. 477 (1955); GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIc LAND LAw
IDVELQPmi5NT 056 (1968).
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This reason should not be enough, however, to induce an
eastern legislature to adopt the government survey rule by
statute for, although land development policy should be taken
into account when determining water development policy,5 2
the land development policy in aid of which the Nebraska
court in Crawford Co. v. Hathaway apparently applied the
government survey rule no longer enjoys the amount of support which it formerly had.5" In the opinion of some, experience with that policy has shown that the interests of the
farmer and of the public could be better served in the long
run by leaving the farmer free to base his decision as to the
size of his farm on economic and scientific factors rather than
by enacting statutes and developing common law rules designed to make it difficult to embark upon large scale agricultural operations."
Although in the later case of Wasserburgerv. Coffee the
Nebraska court did not advert to the policy just referred to
or call attention to its declining influence, the court may well
have had that decline in mind when it substantially curtailed
the scope of applicability of the government survey rule,
which it had previously adopted in Crawford Co. v Hathaway,
by declaring that "[b]etween riparian proprietors restrictions to original entries or to government subdivisions are
clearly arbitrary' '- when determining the permissible extent
52. Carver, A Federal Policy for Development of Western Water, 14 ROCKY
MT. MINERAL L. INST. 473, 494 (1968).
53. At any rate the policy has not been sufficiently influential to attract any
substantial amount of support for the government survey rule. Indeed, the
omission by several leading scholars of any reference to the rule in their
recent writings on the permissible extent of riparian land suggests that in
their opinion it has become moribund. See, e.g., Trelease, Coordination of
Riparian and Appropriative Rights to the Use of Water, 33 TEXAS L. REV.
24, 41 (1954); ZIEGLER, Water Use Under Common Law Doctrines, in
WATER RESOURCES AND THE LAW 49, 51-61 (1958); 5 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY
714 (1920); Bartke & Callahan, 1968 Annual Survey of Michigan
Law, Real and Personal Property,15 WAYNE L. REV. 397, 402 (1968).
54. Support for this position was given by the Interstate Conference on Water
Problems in Sept., 1969 when it adopted a resolution that the 160 acre
limitation on interest free money for irrigation projects under the Reclamation Acts be modified to apply to an acreage considered to be an economic
unit which may be determined from time to time to be justified by economic
and technological changes affecting agriculture in order to promote efficient
and profitable agricultural production. See NEWSLETTER OF THE UNIVERSITIES COUNCIL ON WATER RESOURCES 17 (Nov. 1969). For statistics affording support for this position see Meyers, Book Review, 77 YALE L.J. 1036
(1968). As to Congressional recognition of the validity of this position in
some situations see Trelease, Reclamation Water Rights, 32 ROCKy XT. L.
REV. 464, 491 (1960).
55. 180 Neb. 149, 141 N.W.2d 738, 745 (1966).
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of riparian land and that they disapproved of them. Substantial basis for speculation that doubts regarding the wisdom
of the policy against large landholdings may have accounted
at least in part for the way in which the court dealt in Wasserburger with the government survey rule seems to be afforded
by the strong opposition shown in the western states to federal
enforcement of the provisions in the Reclamation Acts forbidding the use of reclamation project water on more than 160
acres of land held by one owner ;56 an opposition which would
probably have been lcss determined if the policy against large
landholdings had the support of majority opinion in the western states." But regardless of the validity of this speculation,
if the reason given for the government survey rule in Crawford v. Hathaway was not sufficiently persuasive to deter
the Nebraska court from substantially limiting the scope of
the rule by its declaration in Wasserburger,that reason should
not be accepted as an adequate basis for the adoption in the
eastern states of the government survey rule as to the permissible extent of riparian land in view of the undesirable results to which that rule might lead if adopted in the East; results which, if they came to pass, would fully justify the
characterization of that rule in Wasserburger as arbitrary.
Since in some of the eastern states private owners trace
their titles back to England, Holland or the state rather than
to the federal government" s and since many of the grants by
these governments were not controlled with respect to permissible shapes and sizes by statutory specifications, the dimensions of riparian tracts conveyed by original government
grants in the East were far from uniform. In some cases the
acreage may have been quite small. In others it certainly was
very large.59 If the original grant were of a small riparian
56.

As to this opposition see Taylor, The Excess Land Law: Execution of a
Public Policy, 64 YALE L.J. 477 (1955); Meyers, Book Review, 77 YALE
L.J. 1036, 1040-41 (1968).
57. The 160-acre limitation in the Reclamation Acts has, however, the support
of at least one western state. See Middle Rio Grande Water Users Ass'n
v. Middle Rio Grande Conservancy Dist., 57 N.M. 287, 258 P.2d 391 (1953) ;
Trelease, Reclamation Water Rights, 32 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 464, 492 (1960).
58.

4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 18.17, 18.18 (Casner ed. 1952).

59.

In Ledyard v. Ten Eyck, 36 Barb. 102, 103 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1862) reference
was made to the receipt by one Edwards in 1794 of a New York State
patent for 15,000 acres of land which on their northern side had contact
with Cazenovia Lake. Massachusetts conveyed to Gorham and Phelps
2 million acres of the land which it had acquired by cession from New
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tract and if the government survey rule were in force, the
riparian owner could not increase the size of his riparian
holding by acquiring land abutting on one of its borders because it is an unavoidable consequence of the government
survey rule that the original area of a riparian tract cannot be
increased by the acquisition of contiguous land" ° which, because it had no contact with the water at the time of its acquiThis would be
sition, is non-riparian at that time."
so even if the acquired land had once been riparian (because
included in the original government grant) 62 and had lost that
status by a conveyance severing it from the original riparian
tract.6" In other words, under the government survey rule the
area of a riparian tract can be decreased but never increased."
Thus, if a contest arises as to how much of the land belonging to
a riparian owner can qualify as riparian, a court which is
bound by that rule would have to hold that A could not exercise his riparian privileges for the benefit of another tract
acquired by him or enforce riparian rights for the protection
of such a tract unless he could show that such exercise or en-

60.

61.
62.

63.

York under the Treaty of Hartford. This tract contained many lakes. See
Andrews, Lands Under Water in New York, 16 CORNELL L.Q. 277, 279
(1931).
1 WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN UNITED STATES 838 (3rd ed.
1911); 1 KINNEY, THE LAW OF IRRIGATION AND WATER RIGHTS 789, 791
(2d ed. 1912); Crawford Co. v. Hathaway, 67 Neb. 325, 93 N.W. 781, 790
(1903).
See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
6A AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 28.65, at 160 (Casner ed. 1952); Wasserburger v. Coffee, 180 Neb. 149, 141 N.W.2d 738, 745 (1966); Bartke &
Callahan, 1968 Annual Survey of Michigan Law, Real and Personal Property, 15 WAYNE L. REv. 397, 402 (1968).
When a riparian tract is severed by a conveyance of less than all of it,
the part of the tract which after the conveyance has no contact with the
water no longer qualifies as riparian land unless the severing deed provides
to the contrary. See 5 S.C.L.Q. 178 (1952); ZIEGLER, Water Use Under
Common Law Doctrines, in WATER RESOURCES AND THE LAW 49, 60 (1958) ;
MANN, ELLIS & KRAusz, WATER-UsE LAW IN ILLINOIS 17 (1964); Davis,
Australian and American Water Allocation Systems Compared, 9 B.C. IND.
& COM. L. REV. 647, 681 (1968). As to the possibility that the provision
to the contrary may be applied from the circumstances see Hudson v.
Dailey, 156 Cal. 617, 105 P. 748 (1909); HUTCHINS, CALIFORNIA LAW OF
WATER RIGHTS 195 (1956); Rancho Santa Margarita v. Vail, 11 Cal. 2d 501,
81 P.2d 533, 552 (1938); 1 ROGERS & NICHOLS, 9 WATER FOR CALIFORNIA
249-50 (1967); HUTCHINS, Irrigation Water Rights in California, in 452
CALIFORNIA AGRICULTURE

EXPERIMENTAL

STATION

CIRCULAR

(REvISED)

21

(1967).
64. 1 KINNEY, THE LAW OF IRRIGATION AND WATER RIGHTS § 46(a) (2d ed.
1912); Harrell v. City of Conway, 224 Ark. 100, 271 S.W.2d 924, 929 (1954)
(concurring opinion); Waite, Beneficial Use of Water in a Riparian Jurisdiction, 1969 Wis. L. REv. 864, 872.
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forcement would not harm other riparian owners ;6 such a
holding would be required even though the acquired tract were
contiguous to the part of A's land conceded to be riparian,
even though the area of that part was small, and even though
it appeared that under the conditions then prevailing in the
watershed it would clearly be to A's advantage to have the
added land classified as riparian and that he could enjoy riparian privileges and rights in connection with his entire holding without unreasonably reducing the extent to which other
riparian owners could enjoy their riparian privilege and rights
and without conflicting with the public interest in the optimum use of water resources. 6
Since such a holding would deny riparian status to land
from which the water could be reached without commission of
a trespass,67 since in accordance with the variability principle
65. Under the reasonable use version of the riparian doctrine harmless uses
are lawful. See the authorities cited in Farnham, The Improvement and
Modernization of New York Water Law Within the Framework of the
Riparian System, 3 LAND & WATER L. REV. 377, 384, n. 27 (1968).
66. In 1 WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN UNITED STATES § 772, at
842-43 (3rd ed. 1911) it is said:
For exomple, an apportionment may have been made between riparian owners where one riparian owner owns fifty acres and
another five hundred acres, all irrigable, and, other things being
equal, the latttr was given 50 Oinches of water and the former 50.
A year later the former buys 450 acres adjoining and both now
own the same amount of land and have the same needs. Is it in
consonance with the principle of equality to permit the one to practically monopolize the whole stream, when their needs are now
equal? It would clearly not be reasonable in all cases to redivide
the stream by halves, for expenditures or change of position in reliance upon the former division become an important factor in deciding what is reasonable under the new conditions. But that is a
matter for the trial judge or jury to consider, and if he is still convincedon all the facts that a larger area without doing unreasonable
detriment, then, if we are correct, both justice and the law require
that he should so adjudge.
As to the attention which should be paid and is paid to this public interest
see notes 95, 96 infra and accompanying text.
67. The government survey rule is said to be "indefensible on principle" because
the controlling factor when determining whether land is riparian is whether
access to the water can be had from it without committing a trespass. This
author also asserted that Lux v. Haggin, 63 Cal. 255, 10 P. 674 (1884),
which was cited in Crawford Co. v. Hathaway, 67 Neb. 325, 93 N.W. 781,
790 (1903) as having laid down the government survey rule, deciding
"nothing as to the extent of riparian land at common law, but only enforces
the right of the prior appropriator on public land against later entries of
the land." 1 WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN UNITED STATES §§ 769,

770 (3rd ed. 1911). Although the question as to whether Wiel was justified
in rejecting the Nebraska court's interpretation of the ambiguous opinion
in Lux is interesting as well as difficult, it need not be discussed at this
point; for the question under consideration here is not as to the original
source of the government survey rule, but rather as to the advisability of
adopting it in the eastern states.
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of the reasonable use version of the riparian doctrine"8 the extent of the interests of a riparian owner ought to be determined by conditions existing when such interests come in question rather than by conditions which prevailed at an earlier
time, and since the choice of the latter alternative would interfere with the maintenance of a desirable flexibility in the pattern of water use, 9 it seems clear that a fear that the operation of the government survey rule in cases involving small riparian tracts might lead to indisputably arbitrary results is
well founded.7" While they might be tolerated in a state in
which appropriative as well as riparian water rights are recognized and in jurisdictions where the conclusion has been
reached that the public interest requires appropriative water
rights to supplant riparian rights to the greatest extent constitutionally permissible,7 such results should not be accepted
68. At common law the reasonable use version of the riparian doctrine includes
the variability principle by virtue of which a use which is reasonable today
may become unreasonable when conditions change. See Farnham, The
Improvement and Modernization of New York Water Law Within the
Framework of the Riparian System, 3 LAND & WATER L. REv. 377, 391 and
authorities in n. 53 (1968). For a discussion of the extent to which this
principle should be preserved in riparian doctrine states see id. at 405-11.
69. As to the desirability of avoiding rigidity and maintaining flexibility in the
pattern of water use see id. at 409 and authorities in n.126; Maloney &
Ausness, A Modern Proposal for State Regulation of Consumptive Uses of
Water, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 523, 537 (1971).
70. Thus in 36 MICH. L. REV. 346-48 (1937) the government survey rule is
attacked as "too narrow and quite unrealistic," and because under it the
use of water "would be absurdly limited and much land rendered almost
useless". Relevant in this connection is the following passage from BEUSCHER, WATER RIGHTS 137-38 (1967), as quoted in 1969 Wis. L. Ray. 873-74
n.43:
Suppose two cases. Each involves a 160-acre farm in an entire
rectangular parcel-two forties on the river, two forties back from
the river. Both farmers apply for permits to take water from the
river to irrigate for potatoes. The first farmer is told he can have
a permit to irrigate only the two forties on the river; the second
is given a permit to irrigate his entire 160-acre tract. Why: Because the grandfather of the first farmer had sold off the two
rear forties years ago only to buy them back later. This broke the
chain of title. Riparian rights could not be restored as to those
forties. But no one had ever sold off the rear forties on the second
farm so they continued to be riparian land! Compare Application of
Gorell, 2 W.P. 1105, 41 Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm. Rep. 354 (1956) and
Application of Luther, 2 W.P. 1120, 41 Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm. Rep.
467 (1956).
71. Thus although the court in Wasserburger v. Coffee, 180 Neb. 149, 141
N.W.2d 738, 745 (1966) rejected the government survey rule as arbitrary
when applied to a contest between riparian owners, it followed this rejection
with language which could conceivably be interpreted as indicating that it
might be necessary to apply a modified form of the rule in contests between
claimants of riparian interests and claimants of appropriative interests in
order to facilitate accomplishments of the legislature's intention to abolish
unused riparian rights. Dean Trelease, who has made no secret of his
preference for the prior appropriation system of water rights, is apparently
satisfied with the California rule that the riparian right extends only to
the smallest tract held under one title in the chain of title leading to

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1972

21

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 7 [1972], Iss. 1, Art. 2

52

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. VII

in most of the eastern states which, as already indicated, have
elected to continue to operate under the riparian system. 2
It is also possible that results which could fairly be
characterized as arbitrary might be reached under the government survey rule if a very large tract of land had been
conveyed by the original government grant. For example,
100,000 acres of land situated in a wide valley and covered
by one government patent would have to be regarded as riparian, even though much of it lay several miles from the river
flowing through the valley. In sum, since application of the
government survey rule might in some cases result in the
denial of riparian status to land sufficiently close to the
water to deserve it, as pointed out above, and since it might
in other cases lead to the accord of that status to land which
is too far from the water to be entitled to it, it is submitted
that, while legislation is needed to clarify the existing uncertainty as to the permissible extent of riparian land in the
East, the legislation when enacted should not codify the government survey rule.
B. Smallest Tract Rule
If the smallest tract rule7 3 is the substantial equivalent
of the government survey rule as the treatment of these rules
by some courts and authors tend to indicate," it obviously
present owner-a rule which is basically similar to the government survey
rule-because the California rule tends to increase the amount of water
available for appropriation. Trelease, Coordination of Riparian and
Appropriative Rights to the Use of Water, 33 TEXAS L. REV. 24, 41 (1954).
Worthy of note in this connection, however, is the statement of R. W.
Johnson that "[t]he case law announced immediately after the enactment
of the 1917 code indicated that the appropriation system had gained ground.
. . Cases of more recent vintage seem to indicate that [in Washington]
the pendulum has edged back in some areas toward riparianism." Johnson,
Riparian and Public Rights to Lakes and Streams 35 WAsH. L. REv. 580,
590 (1960).
72. See note 1 supra and accompanying text.
73. See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
74. Thus Boehmer v. Big Rock Irrig. Dist., 117 Cal. 19, 48 P. 980 (1897), the
opinion which does not contain a statement of either rule, is cited in Title
Ins. & Trust Co. v. Miller & Lux, 183 Cal. 71, 190 P. 433, 467 (1920) as
establishing the government survey rule, whereas in Rancho Santa Margarita v. Vail, 11 Cal. 2d 501, 81 P.2d 533, 547 (1938) and in Hudson v.
West, 47 Cal. 2d 823, 306 P.2d 807, 810 (1957) Boehmer is cited as supporting the smallest tract rule. Some writers apply the name "source of
title test" to the smallest tract rule. See DAvIs, Australian and American
Water Allocation Systems Compared, 9 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 647, 680-81
(1968). Others apply it to the government survey rule. See Waite, Beneficial Use of Water in a Riparian Jurisdiction, 1969 Wis. L. REV. 864, 872.
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follows that if, as already contended, it would be inadvisable

for an eastern state to adopt the government survey rule, it
would be inadvisable for such a state to adopt the smallest

tract rule. But even if the two rules are separate and distinct
as some authorities have assumed,75 it is submitted that the
smallest tract rule should not be selected for codification be-

cause it is open to the same objections to which the government survey rule is subject.
As in the case of the government survey rule, 6 it seems to
be impossible to find an affirmative reason for choosing the
smallest tract rule which should have any cogency in the
East. One argument which was advanced in Boehmer v. Big
Rock IrrigationDistrict7 for its adoption is substantially the
same as that offered in Crawford Co. v.Hathaway" in support of the government survey rule: viz., that it is consistent

75.

76.
77.
78.

This affords further evidence of a tendency to treat the two rules as one
and the same. See also 5 S.C.L.Q. 178 (1952); 1 ROGER & NICHOLS, WATER
FOR CALIFORNIA 164 (1967) in which the two rules seem to be treated as
equivalents. Moreover, the decision of some writers to make no reference
to the government survey rule, although they are no doubt aware that
some courts had affirmed its existence, may have been based on the unexpressed belief that the two rules constituted but one, and that it was
necessary to refer only to the later version of that single rule-the smallest
tract rule.
See 1 WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES §§ 770-71 (3rd ed.
1911); 1 KINNEY, THE LAW OF IRRIGATION AND WATER RIGHTS § 464 (2d ed.
1912). This section of Kinney is cited in Wasserburger v. Coffee, 180 Neb.
149, 141 N.W.2d 738, 744-45 (1966) as setting forth "recogni2ed tests",
including the government and smallest tract rules, and these rules are
referred to by the court itself as "tests" rather than as "a test". But
neither these textwriters nor the court in Wasserburger indicate to what
extent the rules are different or point out any situations in which the
results which would be reached under one rule would be different from
those which would be arrived at under the other; and apparently no other
textwriter, commentator or court has done so. In all states most landowners
trace their titles back to some governmental grant. 3 AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY §§ 12.15-12.18 (Casner ed. 1952); 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 18.17-20 (Casner ed. 1952). Under the smallest tract rule as under
the governmental survey rule the permissible area of riparian land could
not exceed that covered by the original governmental grant, and land
severed from a riparian tract by conveyance could never regain its riparian
status. See authorities cited in notes 62-65 supra, note 87 infra. It would
seem safe to assume, therefore, that except in a most unusual case, which
apparently has not yet arisen, the same result would be arrived at under
both rules. The probability that this assumption is correct is increased by
the failure of the courts and textwriters to point out any distinction between
the two rules other than that arising from the difference in the language
used to state them.
See notes 50-56 supra and accompanying text.
117 Cal. 19, 48 P. 980 (1897).
67 Neb. 325, 93 N.W. 781, 791 (1903). Since for the reasons pointed out
in note 74 BUpTa it is not clear whether Boehmer established the government survey rule or the smallest tract rule, there is room for doubt as to
whether the reason referred to in the text above was actually offered in
support of the smallest tract rule or as a basis for the government survey
rule.
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with the federal practice of restricting the right of entry
under the homestead and pre-emption laws to 160 acres and
with similar practices followed by the states when disposing
of their lands. But, for reasons already stated, the policy in
aid of which these practises were inaugurated-the policy
against concentration of land ownership in too few handsshould not now be pursued in the East in view of the economic
and scientific factors currently affecting agriculture." While
one additional argument in support of the smallest tract rule
was made in Boehmer: viz., that in the absence of the rule a
riparian owner could expand his riparian holdings to an unlimited extent by purchases of contiguous non-riparian land, 0
the answer is that any state which wishes to avoid such occurrences can do so by adopting the reasonable limit rule, previously referred to8" and discussed hereinafter.8 2
It is true that one textwriter has expressed approval of
the smallest tract rule, apparently on the ground that it provides a satisfactory measure of the permissible extent of riparian land because the amount of land in contact with the
water which a man will buy is normally governed by the requirements of the use which he intends to make of it and because his decision in this regard will usually be sufficiently
judicious to serve not only his advantage but that of the public as well.8" If this brief paraphrase of the textwriter's statements summarizes them with substantial accuracy," it would
seem clear that his defense of the smallest tract rule should not
prevail for it appears to commend the rule for what should be
recognized as a vice rather than a virtue: viz., a tendency to
rigidify a pattern of water use once established and to make
it difficult either to expand original uses or to begin new
ones in response to changed conditions."
79. See notes 50-57 supra and accompanying text.
80. 117 Cal. 19, 26-27,48 P. 908 (1897).
81. See note 49 supra and accompanying text.
82. See note 102 ifra and accompanying text.
83.

See 2 FANHAM, THE LAW OF WATER AND WATER RIGHTS 1571 (1904).

The author confesses that he finds the statements of the earlier Farnham
difficult to interpret.
85. As to the desirability of avoiding rigidity and maintaining flexibility in
the pattern of water use see the authorities referred to in note 69 supra.
Also relevant at this juncture is the statement in Davis, Australian and
84.

American Water Allocation Systems Compared, 9 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv.

647, 681 (1968), "that most farms today have different boundaries than
the original farms."
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Like the government survey rule, the smallest tract rule is
not only open to the objection that no currently cogent reasons
have been offered for its adoption in a riparian doctrine
state, but it is also open to the objection that the consequences
of such a step would be undesirable. Regardless of whether
the smallest riparian tract in the latest owner's chain of title
comprises scanty or extensive acreage, the application of the
smallest tract rule, for the reasons given when discussing the
government survey rule, 6 might lead to clearly arbitrary decisions by which the permissible extent of riparian land would
be too severely restricted in some cases and too leniently expanded in others."7 It would seem clear, therefore, that the
legislation needed to remove the uncertainty existing in the
East as to what land can qualify as riparian should not codify
the smallest tract rule.
C. No Limit Rule
Would it be advisable for a riparian doctrine state to
adopt the no limit rule: viz., that the size of a tract of land is
immaterial insofar as its character as riparian land is concerned ? A presumption in favor of this rule is created by
the support given it in the Torts Restatement,89 by Wiel, 0 and
by the well reasoned and often cited case of Jones v. Conn."
Furthermore, the rule is deserving of support insofar as it
permits the increase in the size of a riparian tract by the ac86. See notes 60-73 supra and accompanying text.
87. It is a consequence of the smallest tract rule as well as of the government
survey rule that the size of a riparian tract can never be increased and
that the smallest tract rule will therefore often prove highly restrictive
in operation. 1 KINNEY, THE LAW OF IRRIGATION AND WATER RIGHTS 790
(2d ed. 1912); 1 WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN UNITED STATES 771
(3rd ed. 1911); Davis, Australian and American Water Allocation Systems
Compared, 9 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 647, 681 (1968); 5 POWELL, REAL
PROPERTY
714, at 371-74 (1920); 36 MIcH. L. REV. 346-48 (1937); 1966
Wis. L. Rev. 172, 182. Even if the smallest tract in the chain of title
comprises thousands of acres, all of it that lies within the watershed must
be recognized as riparian. See 1 KINNEY, THE LAW OF IRRIGATION AND
WATER RIGHTS 790 (2d ed. 1912). Thus in Alta Land & Water Co. v.
Hancock, 85 Cal. 219, 229-30, 24 P. 645 (1890), the court said that "the
occupants of each and every tract held as an entirety, bordering on the
stream, whatever its extent" have riparian rights, and held that land over
a half a mile from a stream was riparian. See also Rancho Santa Margarita v. Vail, 11 Cal. 2d 501, 81 P.2d 533 (1938).
88. See note 48 supra and accompanying text.
89. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 843, comment c, at 327 (1939).
90. 1 WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN UNITED STATES 836-37 (3rd ed.
1911).
91. 39 Ore. 30, 64 P. 855, rehearing denied 39 Ore. 46, 65 P. 1068 (1901).
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quisition of additional land contiguous to it, even though the
added land had been non-riparian ever since its passage from
governmental to private ownership. 2 Moreover, it precludes
prevalence of the doctrine that the total area of riparian land
can decrease but never increase, a doctrine which, as already
noted, is an undesirable consequence of both the government
survey and smallest tract rules.9" There undoubtedly will be
situations in which riparian owner A can claim water for land
added to his riparian tract without unreasonably curtailing
the amount of water available for riparian owners B and C
and without prejudice to the public interest in the optimum
use of water resources;" an interest which some states have
already held must be taken into account when passing on the
reasonableness and legality of a water use" and to which
other riparian doctrine states should accord the same importance." If the situation prevailing in northwestern Wisconsin is typical of that existing elsewhere in that state and in
other states, the adoption of this rule would substantially increase the amount of land which could qualify as riparian. 7
92. See quotation from Jones v. Conn, supra note 48; 1 KINNEY, THE LAW OF
IRRIGATION AND WATER RIGHTS 465 (2d ed. 1912); ZIEGLER, Water Use
Under Common Law Doctrines, in WATER RESOURCES AND THE LAW 49, 60
(1958) ; Davis, Australian and American Water Allocation Systems Compared, 9 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 647, 681 (1968); 36 MICH. L. REV. 346-48
(1937).
93. See note 64 supra and accompanying text; note 87 supra.
94. See notes 66, 70 supra.
95. See Farnham, The Improvement and Modernization of New York Water
Law Within the Framework of the Riparian System, 3 LAND & WATER
L. REV. 377, 394-95 (1968).
96. Parish v. Pitts, 244 Ark. 1239, 429 S.W.2d 45, 47 (1968); HOLMES, THE
COMMON LAW 35-36 (1881); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 347-50, 827-28
(1939) ; PROSSER, TORTS 618, 622 (3rd ed. 1964); 5 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY
713, at 369 (1920); Lauer, Reflections on Riparianism,35 Mo. L. REV. 1,
24-25 (1970); Levi, Highest and Best Use: An Economic Goal for Water
Law, 34 Mo. L. REv. 165, 168 (1969); Maloney, Plager & Baldwin, Water
Pollution, 20 U. FLA. L. REV. 131, 136 (1967); 84 U. PA. L. REV. 630-37
(1936). Of course the determination as to whether a particular use of a
lake or stream is in the public interest is a difficult task. A court's
conclusion in this regard will not always win unanimous approval, particularly when consideration of the public interest results in serious harm
to a valuable water-based business as it did in Joslin v. Marin Municipal
Water Dist., 67 Cal. 2d 132, 429 P.2d 889, 60 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1967). The
emphasis put in this case on the public interest at the expense of the
complaining riparian is deplored in Van Alstyne, Inverse Condemnation:
Unintended PhysicalDamage, 20 HAST. L.J. 431, 472 (1969).
97. Thus in Davis, Australian and American Water Allocation Systems Compared, 9 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 647, 681 (1968), it is pointed out that
a recent study of the situation in northwestern Wisconsin indicates that
the no limit rule would allow 64% more land to qualify as riparian than
would the government survey and smallest tract rules.
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But granting that the no limit rule is free from one of the
two serious objections to the government survey and smallest
tract rules-that in some cases they would arbitrarily lead to
the denial of riparian privileges and rights to land which
ought to enjoy them 9 -- an it not be argued that the no limit
rule is open to the second serious objection to which the government survey and smallest tract rules are subject, i.e., that
it would in some cases arbitrarily lead to the recognition of
riparian privileges and rights in land which did not deserve
them in view of its distance from the stream ?" Furthermore,
is it not arguable that the failure of the no limit rule to impose
any restriction on the amount of added land which can become
riparian when acquired by riparian owner A poses too much
of a threat to the interests of riparian owners B and C ? It
was this threat which the English courts may have had in
mind when they denied riparian status to land areas far distant
from the stream, although they were parts of tracts bordering
upon it and held by one owner.' 0
D. Reasonable Limit Rule
To be weighed against this objection to the no limit rule
is an argument substantially similar to the one which, as previously noted, can be argued against enforcement of a watershed limitation on the permissible extent of riparian land:
viz., that riparians B and C need not fear that they will be
unfairly prejudiced under the no limit rule if A, an upper
riparian owner, wishes to use water on the rear part of a riparian tract of great acreage because under the riparian system no use of water, even if on land classified as riparian,
can be legal unless it is reasonable under all the circumstances
and because one of the circumstances which would certainly
be taken into account when deciding the reasonableness issue
would be the distance from the lake or stream of the area on
which A proposed to use the water. That these rules would
afford B and C considerable protection against monopolization of the water by A is clear; it can be argued, nevertheless,
98. See notes 67-70 supra and accompanying text; note 87 supra.
99. See notes 72-73 supra and accompanying text; note 87 supra.
100. See the quotations from the opinions in the McCartney and Attwood cases
note 49 supra.
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that in a case in which the question regarding the legality of
A's intended use is a close one, B's and C's chances of persuading the court that A should be enjoined from harming
them by withdrawing enough water to supply distant parts
of his large tract would be greater if the court were faced
with two questions: (1) whether all of A's large tract could
qualify as riparian under the reasonable limit rule and (2)
whether, if all his land was riparian, his use on its rear areas
would be reasonable. If the court were confronted only with
the question regarding the reasonableness of A's use, as would
be the case if it were operating under the no limit rule, certainly B's and C's chances of success would be lessened.
While acceptance of this line of thought would seem to
involve a willingness to load the dice somewhat in favor of
riparians B and C and their riparian tracts of normal size,
it could be argued that in a state in which riparian rights
have been recognized from its earliest days B and C are entitled to this advantage because their possession of it is necessary to give adequate protection in close cases to their natural
and reasonable expectations when they bought their land, i.e.,
the acreage of a tract bordering on a body of water which
could qualify as riparian would not be unlimited, even though
all of it were in the watershed of the lake or stream involved.
Elementary fairness requires adequate protection for such
reasonable and natural expectations on the strength of which
men have invested their labor and capital. A, on the other
hand, would have little basis for objecting to protection for
B and C to this extent because it is doubtful that he expected
when he acquired his large tract that all of it would qualify
as riparian simply because one side of it bordered on a lake or
stream and because, if he had entertained such an expectation,
it would not have been a natural and reasonable one.
RECOMMENDATIONS

Precedent for legislation permitting increase in the size
of a riparian tract by the acquisition of contiguous nonriparian land is afforded by a Virginia statute reading as
follows:
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol7/iss1/2
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Real property under common ownership and
which is not separated from riparian land by land of
any other ownership shall likewise be deemed riparian land notwithstanding that such real property is
divided into tracts and parcels which may not bound
upon the watercourse.''
While it is to be hoped that the other eastern states will follow
Virginia's example by enacting legislation which will prevent
their courts and administrative agencies from following either
the government survey or smallest tract rule, it is also to be
hoped that any new legislation will make it clear that no land
can qualify as riparian to a lake or stream unless it lies not
only within the watershed of the lake or stream but also within
a reasonable distance therefrom, regardless of whether the
question as to the permissible extent of riparian land arises
because of the inclusion of many square miles of land in an
original government patent or because an owner of a concededly riparian parcel acquires a contiguous non-riparian tract.
Would legislation of this sort be upheld against challenge
on constitutional grounds? It seems clear that this question
could be answered in the affirmative in any eastern state which
now lacks a definition of riparian land or has one which is uncertain, as most of them do. 0 2 Surely the courts have power to
fill gaps in the common law or to clarify rules which have been
troublesome because of doubt as to their exact content; no constitutionally protectible property rights can be based on a
non-existent rule or even on an uncertain one. And it would
also seem clear that if an eastern state should enact such legislation, its courts would not have to strike it down as unconstitutional on the ground that either the government survey rule
prevailing in Texas,"0 3 the smallest tract rule in force in
California,"' or the no limit rule established in Oregon"u5 had
become part of the common law binding on the courts of the
eastern state and that interests arising from these definitions
in the body of water involved had vested and could not be
impaired without compensation. Because of the objectionable
101. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-104(5) (1968).
102.
103.
104.
105.

See
See
See
See

notes 11, 12 supra and accompanying text.
note 46 supra.
note 47 supra.
note 48 supra.
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consequences of these rules and because they would not be
adapted to the needs and conditions in the eastern state,' its
courts could and should hold that the decisions adopting them
in other states had not become part of the common law of the
eastern state." 7
Whether the Virginia statutory definition of riparian
land, which is silent with respect to both the watershed limitation and the reasonable limit rule,"' could constitutionally
be amended so as to include them is perhaps a more debatable
question. Nevertheless, in view of the public interest in preventing friction between neighboring landowners and of cases
upholding as valid exercises of the police power statutes designed to preclude such friction by effecting an equitable adjustment of property rights and privileges as between the
neighbors, 0 ' it seems likely that legislation containing a definition of riparian land which included the watershed and
106. See notes 86, 87, 100, 101 supra and accompanying text.
107. Tending to support these conclusions is Duval v. Thomas, 114 So.2d 791,
795 (Fla. 1959) in which the court rejected the contention that a Florida
statute adopting the English common law in effect in 1776 precluded it
from holding that it was lawful for the riparian owners on a non-navigable lake, each of whom owned a part of its bed, to pass in boats over
the entire lake and said:
[O]ur own research has not divulged the clear, unambiguous pronouncement of the common law in effect 4 July 1776, that would
[W]hen grave
leave us no room but to adopt it in this case ....
doubt exists of a true common law doctrine such as would govern
dual or multiple ownership of property like Lake Calm, we may
exercise a 'broad discretion' taking 'into account the changes in
our social and economic customs and present day conceptions of
right and justice.'
It is . . . only when the common law is plain that we must
observe it. In making the observation that the common law relating
to the question involved is unclear, we have not disregarded decisions of the courts of other states. . . . But we have not found
cases from the English courts . . . fixing the relative rights of
owners of the bed of a lake of the nature of Lake Calm.
Also pertinent in this connection is the following passage from O'Connell,
Iowa's New Water Statute, 47 IOWA L. REv. 549, 595 (1962): "To the
extent that they [water rights] are uncertain, logically a reasonable change
under the police power alter expectations less, and arguably thereby does
not deprive a riparian of property without due process of law.
108. See note 101 supra and accompanying text. It apparently has not yet been
decided whether this statute, by its failure to include the watershed limitation, supercedes Town of Gordonsville v. Zinn, supra note 16 which
supports that limitation, or whether that case still controls this point
because of the failure of the statute to contradict the case expressly.
109. Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 523-24 (1896); Hathorn v. Natl
Carbonic Gas Co., 194 N.Y. 326, 87 N.E. 504 (1909); Nelson v. DeLong,
213 Minn. 425, 7 N.W.2d 342, 348 (1942); People v. N.Y. Carbonic Acid
Gas Co., 196 N.Y. 421, 90 N.E. 441 (1909); Riteout v. Knox, 148 Mass. 368,
19 N.E. 390 (1809); Dunham, A Legal and Economic Basis for City
Planning, 58 COL. L. REv. 650, 666-67 (1958); Ellis, Modification of the
Riparian Theory and Due Process in Missouri, 34 Mo. L. REV. 562, 572
(1969); Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 67 (1964).
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reasonable limit rules, and so provided protection for the
natural and reasonable expectations of owners of land bordering on lakes and streams, ' ° and which would therefore tend
toward a distribution of privileges and rights with respect to
the water which such owners would view as equitable, would
be upheld as a valid exercise of the police power, even though
its application would involve the infliction of some uncompensated diminution in the extent or value of the water privileges
and rights of part of the members of the group.
110. See notes 29-32, 38-39 supra and accompanying text.
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